



Much of the attention in policy and litigation
surrounding school finance has focused on school
districts—specifically, to ensure adequate educa-
tional resources in all districts or equitable resources
across districts. The implicit assumption in district-
based averages is that all schools within the district
receive the district’s average level of resources.
Evidence accumulated in recent years, though, has
shown that wide disparities in student character-
istics, teacher characteristics, and resources exist
at the school level, and these disparities may be as
large as or even larger than those across districts.
(See, for example, Stiefel, Rubenstein, and Schwartz,
2004, and Roza and Hill, 2004.) Moving from the
current “quasi-public” system to one in which
parents have more complete choice of schools
could, in fact, reduce these disparities, but the
effects are not entirely clear (and the simulations
are not designed to model them). As the simulations
show, a market-based system in which parents
receive vouchers reduces disparities across wealth-
ier and poorer districts as higher-income families
move into poorer areas. An important supplement
to this analysis would be to examine disparities in
school quality within, as well as across, districts.
Although the sorting across districts may be
largely related to the sorting of families and tax
bases, sorting within districts may be more complex.
An important assumption in such an analysis is how
to model teacher sorting. Under a purely private
system it may be safe to assume that teachers are
subject to the same market forces as other profes-
T
he paper “Alternative Education Finance
Strategies” by Thomas Nechyba (2006)
examines issues often ignored in shaping
and analyzing school finance policy—
namely, the effects of behavioral responses to inter-
governmental grants. To the extent that attention
is paid to these behavioral responses, it is often
limited to school district responses—that is, the
ways in which school districts might alter taxing
and spending policies in response to changes in
income or prices brought about by changes in state
funding formulas. The analyses in this paper,
though, do not assume that policies operate in a
vacuum or that district characteristics are static.
Instead, the paper incorporates simulations of the
resulting behavioral responses by families and
the potential effects of these responses on school
quality, segregation, and spending. 
This paper makes a strong theoretical case for
adopting a family-based funding system, and I
believe that recent policy initiatives may inevitably
move us in that direction in the future. For example,
around the country we have seen bitter disputes
over the amount of funding charter schools should
receive for each student enrolled (see Vanourek,
2005, and Loh, 2005) because the systems currently
in place are simply not designed to fund individual
students. With direct aid to parents, of course,
these funding mechanisms would be quite simple.
The simulations in the paper also raise a number
of important policy issues and questions that would
need to be addressed to develop an effective family-
based funding system. 
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teachers who would best match the school, within
the school’s budget constraint. If we assume more
equalized spending across schools, this would
require schools to make trade-offs between teacher
quality and other school inputs, such as class size
(assuming that higher-quality teachers receive
higher salaries, on average). As Nechyba points out
in the paper, public school teacher assignment is
very different from the scenario just described.
Instead, we typically find the most experienced
and educated teachers sorting not only into the
districts with the most advantaged students, but
also into the schools with the most advantaged
students within those districts. Seniority transfer
rights and single salary schedules provide no incen-
tives for teachers to teach in schools with greater
needs. It is not clear whether school finance reform
that doesn’t address these intradistrict resource
allocation mechanisms can truly equalize educa-
tional opportunities within school districts. This
may not be a concern in small districts, but in
large urban areas with many schools, for example
St. Louis and its almost 100 schools, some level
of equalization could occur between St. Louis and
its suburbs but have relatively little effect on the
poorest schools within St. Louis.
LESSONS FROM HIGHER
EDUCATION
It is not uncommon for ideas that might be
considered radical and politically untenable in K-12
education to be standard operating procedure in
higher education. The idea of vouchers for elemen-
tary and secondary school students, with much
more fluid competition among public and private
providers, is an example of such as idea. Though
not referred to as “vouchers,” the federal and state
governments provide an array of grants, scholar-
ships, tax credits, and subsidized loans that follow
students to any institution of higher learning, public
or private, at which he or she chooses to enroll.
While there are critical differences between higher
education and elementary/secondary education,
there may also be lessons to learn in the design of
a K-12 state aid system targeted to parents. 
First, depending on the structure of the system,
we may not see the demise of public schools or
even a dramatic reduction in their share of the
market. Under our current system, approximately
10 percent of elementary and secondary school
students are enrolled in private schools, whereas
in higher education approximately 23 percent are
enrolled in private institutions (National Center for
Education Statistics, 2005). The effects of family-
based aid, though, would likely depend on whether
public schools continue to receive direct state or
local subsidies that allow them to charge prices
below the actual cost of providing educational
services. Second, higher education is extremely
stratified: An average of only 3 percent of students
at the nation’s most selective institutions come from
the bottom income quartile; 74 percent of students
at the most selective institutions come from the
highest quartile (Carnevale and Rose, 2004). This
stratification is evident even at many elite public
institutions, despite their relatively low net prices.
The causes of this inequality are complex, of course,
but an important contributing factor is admission
policies at elite schools that heavily weight stan-
dardized test scores (such as the SAT) along with
other nonacademic factors, such as legacies and
athletic ability (Bowen, Kurzweil, and Tobin, 2005).
This suggests that if we hope to reduce segregation
and stratification in elementary and secondary
schools, a purely free market system that allows
schools to choose the students they enroll, “cream
skimming,” as the paper describes, may do little
to achieve this goal. At the same time, if a family-
based funding system were successful at reducing
inequalities in elementary and secondary educa-
tion, it could also be a powerful force for reducing
stratification in higher education as well.
THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS
Although this statement is true to some extent
for any public policy, the devil may be in the details
when attempting to design a family-based aid
system that maximizes benefits without creating
unintended negative consequences. As the paper
recognizes, determining which students or families
should be targeted and how much funding such
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critical challenges in the design of such a system. 
A simple “lump sum” grant of equal amount
to all families is likely to exacerbate stratification
because schools would face a strong disincentive
to enroll the most costly-to-educate students. Grants
of sufficient size for students with special needs
could, though, lead to greater opportunities for
such students as school entrepreneurs compete to
offer high-quality specialized programs for such
students. This raises two potential problems. First,
such a system might inevitably lead to more isola-
tion of students with special needs, a situation
many advocates would consider unacceptable
regardless of the quality of the programs. Second,
how do we determine the appropriate grant level?
Though a number of methods have been proposed,
no broadly accepted methodology exists to deter-
mine the cost of educating various types of students
(see Duncombe and Yinger, 2005, for a discussion
of these methods). Moreover, we typically focus on
the average costs of such students, but have little
understanding of the marginal costs of educating
the first student with a learning disability, for exam-
ple, as compared with the twentieth. To unleash a
robust and competitive market, the grants would
need to be sufficiently high to bring entrepreneurs
into the market willing to serve all students. At the
same time, we can ill-afford to offer excessively
high grants simply to guarantee that supply of
schools. 
In closing, I want to stress that these comments
are not meant to suggest flaws in the logic or careful
analysis presented in the paper, but simply to point
out some of the other critical issues that these
analyses raise. Ultimately, I am afraid I end with
the stereotypical academic’s plea: the call for more
research to help us better understand the important
ramifications that these policy decisions have on
children’s opportunities.
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